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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLATR R. ROGERS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
PRANCES ,J. ROGERS ANDREWS,

Case No.
11875

Dde lldant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order and Decree of
the District Court modifying the Decree of Divorce heretofore made and t>ntered, by awarding the permanent
custody of the two minor children of the parties to the
father with the right of the mother to have the custody
of said children for one day and one night each wt>ek.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
By a Decree of Divorce made and entered in 1961,
the custody of the two minor children was awarded to
the Defendant with visitation rights to the Plaintiff.
Although there were a number of restraining orders
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compelling the Plaintiff to visit the children only in the
presence of the Defendant, who was their mother, the
parties worked out an agreement whereby the children
had overnight visitations each week with the Plaintiff.
This arrangement continued until June 10, 19u9, wlwn
the Plaintiff filed an affidavit, and pursuant thereto an
Order to Show Cause was issued on June 16, 1969,
wherein the Plaintiff sought to have the custody of the
children changed. The youngest of the two minor children had in May of 1969 reached the age of ten years
and based on Section 30-3-10 and Section 30-3-5, of the
Utah Code Annotated, which has now been rewritten,
Plaintiff contended that both the children had reached
the age of ten years and were therefore entitled to select
1he parent to which each child would attach himself. On
the 18th of June, after a hearing in which both parties
were present and presented evidence, the Court took
the matter under advisement and on the 24th day of
June, 1969, modified the Decree by awarding to the
father, the custody of the children during the summer
months only, from June until September, with the right
of the Defendant to visit with said children over night
one day each week. Late in August, 1969, Plaintiff registered the boys in the elementary school and junior
high school of Plaintiff's district. (Tr. 23). On the 2nd
day of September when Defendant attempted to get
the children back to register them in their proper district
where she resides, to-wit, in Sunset, Davis County, Utah,
considerable difficulty and unpleasantness arose and shr
was required to obtain the assistance of the Juvenile
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Court officer to enforce the order of the District Court
('J'r. 23-27-51). 'rhereafter, Defendant took the boys to
her home and prepared to send them to their schools in
her district. She registered them in the Sunset schools
(Tr. 53). After spending the night of September 3rd in
her home, the boys on September 4th left for school. They
did not attend the schools in which they were registered,
however, but instead, called a certain woman who was
the sister of the Plaintiff's present wife (Tr. 123-125).
She picked the boys up and took them to her apartment
and kept them from contacting the Defendant during the
entire day. After numerous calls to the Plaintiff and the
Police Department and Sheriff's office, the children at
10 :30 p.m. were located in the home of the Plaintiff
(Tr. 58), by a Juvenile Court officer of Weber County.
When she was informed of the situation, Defendant consented to having the Juvenile Court officer take them
into his custody until the following morning. When she
went for the children at 10 :00 a.m. the next day, Plaintiff had obtained an exparte order, changing the custody
of the children from the mother to the father. The Defendant came to the chambers of the Honorable Charles
G. Cowley, the District Judge who had heard this matter,
with an affidavit and an Order prepared by her attorney
in line with the previous Decree of June 24, 1969. At
that time Judge Cowley made a Minute Order as follows:
"Defendant's requested Order submitted to
the judge in chambers at about 4 :15 p.m., Friday,
September 5, 1969, for custody of the two boys,
in the opinion of the Court is well taken; however,
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beeamw th(• }waring- i:-; hut on<' \YPek awa)- and
for th<' further reason that the transfer of thP
bo)-s back and forth might havP some impact on
thl'm, therefore the Court refrains from signing
tlw ordPr at this timP, and the boys may remain
with the father until the hearing September 15,
1969, without prejudic<> to the custody rights of
the defrndant."
Charles G. Cowlf':-..Jndge
(Tr. 16)
Thereafter, a Petition was filed by the Plaintiff, requesting the modification of the Decree of Divorce to
change the custody. On September 18 the matter came
on for hearing. After both sides had presented a number
of witnesses, the Court took the matter under advisement
and on September 24, made and cnkred its order granting permanent custody of the two boys to the Plaintiff
with the right of defendant to have overnight \Tisits once
each week. It is from this Order that the Defendant
appeals.
Thereafter, Defendant filed a further Affidavit and
Motion, asking the Court to fix a definite time for her
overnight visits, the Plaintiff having failed and refused
to give her any definite time in which to have said minor
ehildren with her. After a hearing on this matter on
the 14th day of October, tlw Court, after considerable
discussion (Tr. 26) fixed a definite period of time for
Defendant's ovPrnight visits.
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RELIEF 80UGH1' ON THE RULING
The appeal asks this Court to reverse the ruling of
tl1e 'L1ria1 Court denying her Motion of Se1Jtember 5 in
which she requested the Court to enforce its prior Deeree and to vacate and set aside the
and later
permanent order which it had made granting the Plaintiff custody of said minor children with only Defendant's
right to visit them overnight on week ends ('rr. 20).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ever since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the
two little boys grew up in the home of the Defendant in
an apparently normal fashion. Defendant, after certain
nnpleasant matters with the Plaintiff were straightened
out, and after the boys reached an age that they were able
to care for themselves, permitted them to have weekly
overnight visits with the Plaintiff. During that time, however, Plaintiff let it be known on a number of occasions
that he would make every effort to get the children away
from the Defendant once they reached the age of ten
years. He apparently pointed his efforts toward the time
when the youngest boy would reach the age of ten years
and based upon the Sections of the Statntei, herein referred to was determined to obtain the custody of the
children upon the youngest one's reaching the age of
ten years. Therefore, in June, on Order to Show Cause
was issued to determine whether or not the Court should
change the custody of the children. There was no effort
on the part of the Plaintiff to show an unfitness upon
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the part of the mother, the Defendant herein, to have
the custody. This Plaintiff's whole Petition was based
on the fact that the youngest child was now ten years of
age, and that therefore they were entitled to select the
parent to which they would attach themselves. Both of
the boys expressed a desire to the Court in the Chambers
to go with their father. Therefore, the Court on June
24 modified the Decree of Divorce by giving the custody
of the boys to the Plaintiff during the summer months,
with overnight visits to the mother, the Defendant, during June, July, and August. During that time the boys
were taken on numerous smnmer picnics, motor boat
parties, and Defendant had a considerable amount of
trouble getting her overnight visits. Early in August
Plaintiff, while he had the boys in his custody, brought
t11em to the home of the Defendant, rang the doorbell
of the Defendant, and when she appeared, stated to her:
"The boys have something to tell yon" (Tr. 20). The
boys then proceeded to tell the Defendant that they were
not coming home. Plaintiff then left with the children.
On August 18, while the boys were still in the custody of
the Plaintiff, he took them and registered them in a
junior high school and an elementary school in his District. When the 2nd of September arrived, Defendant
went to get the children and was unable to do so. After
considerable difficulty with the Plaintiff, she obtained a
certified copy of the last Order of the Court and with
a Juvenile Court officer went to the schools and took
the boys out, drove them to the schools in Sunset, Davis
County, Utah, and registered them there in her own
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District (Tr. 75-78). After spending one night in her
home, the boy:_ left for school but did not go to school
Instead, they telephoned one Ann Bodily, who was a
sister of the present Mrs. Rogers. She had them taken
to her apartment and kept them during the entire day
(Tr. 34). Plaintiff, at 10 :45 p.rn. called the Defendant
and told her that he had the boys in his home. Defendant
then called a Juvenile Court officer in Ogden, who took
the boys with the consent of the Defendant into his
custody until the following morning. When the Defendant went for the children, she discovered that Judge
Cowley had made a temporary ex parte order awarding
them back to the father for the winter months (Tr. 105).
8he was also informed that the children were then back
in Plaintiff's custody. An Affidavit and Petition were
filed and after a hearing on September 18, the Court
took the matter under advisement and on September 24
made and thereafter entered an Order changing the
pennanent custody of the boys to the father, the Plaintiff,
with the right of the Defendant to have overnight visits
with the boys once a week.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TH.1£ '1,RIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AN ORDER CHANGING THE CUSTODY
FROM THE MOTHER, DEFENDANT, TO
THE PLAINTIFF, FATHER.
About the only basis and reason for the Court's
changing the custody of the children in its order of
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September 24, was the fact that the children wanted to
go with their father. There was no showing at any
time that the Defendant had been anything other than
a good, conscientious, devoted mother to these boys. She
had made as honest effort to make their life as normal
and happy as possible under the circmnstances and had
voluntarily permitted them to have weekly overnight
visits with the Plaintiff. During all of this time and
while they were visiting with their father, the boys were
systematically turned away from their mother. They
had been given considerable leeway and freedom while in
the custody of their father and of course were for sevPra.l years merely overnight guests of the Plaintiff. He
had no responsibility in the raising and disciplining of
the boys and they had a party each week end with him
on their visits. We 'Submit that the prime consideration
in this case should not be the desires of the children,
but the Court must be guided as to the welfare and the
best interests of the children, and the persona.I desires
of the parent and of said children must yield to determine
·what is best for the children's ultimate good. Larkin vs.
Lr1rki11, (1963), 85 Idaho 610, 382 Pac.2nd 784.

"It was held in Larkin v. Larkin (1963), 85
Idaho 610, 382 P2d 784, that in determining which
of tlw parties to a divon'<' action should have thP
of a minor child, the paramount consideration hv which th<' court must lw guided is the
welfarti
best interest:,; of the child, and that
the personal desires of th<' parent, and even the
wishes of the minor child, mnst yield to the determination of "·hat is best for the child's ultimate
good.
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In Berkshire v. Caley (1901), 157 Ind. 1, 60
NE 696, it was held that the wishes or desires of
an infant of discretion, in respect to its custody,
are frequently considered by the trial court, not
because such infant has the legal right to demand
that its wishes be regarded, but because it is
proper for the court to be informed relative
thereto, in order that it may be better prepared
to wisely exercise its discretion upon the question
of the custody of such child; the court also stated,
however, that the trial court was not to be influenced in any degree by the mere whims of the
infant, but could have regard for its feelings,
attachments, and reasonable preferments, and its
probable contentment and happiness, incidental to
its custody. In the instant case, the court apparently gave considerable weight to the preference
of a 9-year-old child."
"While holding that the expression of desire
of an infant of 8 years as to which parent it would
rather live with may be given consideration the
court in Bowman v. Bowman (1950), 313 Ky. 806,
233 SW2d 1020, held that such expressions of
desire were not binding on the court, which must
look to the welfare of the child rather than to its
desires."
"The court in Graves v. Wooden (1956, Mo.
App.), 291 SW2d 665, recognized that a child's
wishes, although entitled to consideration, are not
to be indulged if they are inconsistent with the
attainment of the paramount objective, that is,
furtherance of the child's welfare."

In 4 ALR 3rd, 1410, we find this interesting annotation:
"The polestar by which the courts are to be
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guided whenever they consider tht> question of a
child's custody is the best interest and welfare
of the child. The dominant thought is that children are not chattels, but intelligent and moral
beings, and as such, tht>ir interest and welfarr
are of first consideration. All other considerations, including the wishes of tht> child, must yield
to the child's overall welfart> .

. . . In ToblPr Y. 'I'oblPr (1956), 78 Idaho 218,
299 P2d 490, it was held that while the wish of
the child to be awarded to one of the parents
where the parents wt>re separated and both parties
were shown to be suitable persons to have the
custody was not finally determinative of the issues, it was a proper matter for a trial court to
consider with other evidPnct> in determining the
child's best interest, the court taking the position
that the wishes of the child must yield to the
determination of what is best for such child's
ultimate good."
In 4 ALR 3rd, p. 1412:
"Although practically all cases in which the
Court refuses to give effect to the child's wishes
may impliedly stand for the principle that such
wishes are subordinate to the child's best interests,
this subsection includes only those cases, not
stated in specific connnections indicated by appropriate headings elsewhere in the annotation,
which are illustrative of the courts' disregard of
the child's wishes, in view of thP presence of
objective factors affecting its welfare which were
contrary to its wishes.
While recognizing that a child, who by reason
of its years is capablf' of indicating a preference
regarding custody, is entitled to express its views,
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to which a court will always give careful considPration, the court in McCullough v. McCullough
(1953), 222 Ark. 390, 260 SW2d 463, held that
the expression of a preference was not binding
upon the court, and that the chancellor would
look behind mere words, appraise conditions, circumstances, and contributing factors, and would
alter an order of custody only when a change
would be in the minor's best interests. Finding
that the boy in this case, 15 years of age, had been
carefully reared in a Christian home where evidence of the slightest di'scord was wholly lacking,
the court declined to remove the boy from the
custody of his mother despite the fact that the
child and had expressed a preference to live with
his father.
The court in Anderson v. Anderson (1937),
122 Conn. 600, 191 A 534, affirmed the decision
of the trial court, which disregarded the stated
preference of a 7-year-old child to remain with
this father and grandfather, because the court
found that although the child's present happiness
would best be served by remaining with his father,
the mother was better equipped to exercise the
discipline and control which was needed for his
guidance during the years of hi s childhood and
adolescence, and that the care and training which
she would furnish would be more beneficial to
him than that given by his father and grandfather.
1

It was held by Abair v. Everly (1959), 130
Ind. App. 192, 163 NE2d 34, that the fact that
the children whose custody was at issue, aged
41;2 and 20 years, had expressed a desire to be
with their father, raither than to go out of the
state with their mother, certainly would not con-
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stitute a change of conditions warranting a changr
of a previous decre<> awarding their custod:,' to
the mother. Tlrns, the court apparently took the
position that although the v.rishes of children may
bf' a factor to be considered in a custody proceeding, they are not controlling, and do not of themselves represent a sufficient change of conditions
to warrant a change of a prior custodial decree
wihch was based upon the childrf'n's best wishes.
It was held in Lnrsen v. Henrichs (1948), 239
Iowa 1009, 33 NW2d 383, that although in caseR
involving the custody of a minor, the desire of
the minor was to be considered, various other
factors were not to be lost sight of, such as the
age of the minor, the length of time the minor had
lived in the homf' for which the prf'ferencf' was
stated, the nature of the associations therein, the
contacts with the one seeking a change of custody, the relationship and past associations, the
natural and legal rights of th<> contending parties,
and any other matters throwing light thereon.
Taking all of these factors in consideration, the
court concluded that the wishes of the 11-year-old
child in the instant case to be placed in the custody of her mother were not in her best interests,
and divided the child's custody between her mother
and grandmother.

In an action for modification of a custody
decree, the wishes of two children, one of whom
was 7 or 8 years old and the other 12 years old,
were held entitled to less weight than in an original hearing on custody in Smith v. Smith 1965),
Iowa 133 NW2d 677, where the court apparently
gave more emphasis to the best interests and
welfare of the children. On appeal by the mother
from a decree awarding custody of the children
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to the father during the smruner months although
the original divorce decree gave custody to the
mother and restricted the father's visiting rights
to Saturdays, the father contended that since the
mother had moved some distance from him in
order to obtain employment, and since this entailed some extensive traveling on the part of the
children, he should be granted their custody during the summer months. Rejecting this and reversing this part of the decree below, the court
noted that while the children's letters expressed
love for the father, a dislike for school, and a
desire to live with him, the mother was providing
a good home for them, with good supervision for
them while she was at work both before and after
school each day, and had moved for the express
purpose of taking a position which would enable
her to provide adequately for them, and held that
as to the younger child, its wishes should be given
little if any weight, since it was not of an age
to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian. As
to the 12-year-old, the court held that its wishes
should not be given as much consideration in an
application for change in custody based on alleged
subsequent change in circumstances as they would
perhaps be entitled to in an original hearing on
custody. In this connection, the court pointed
out that the wishes of both children may well have
been influenced by the fact that since they had
spent only Saturdays (nonschool days) with their
father, they associated homework with their
mother and that their father may have represented
an environment free of homework.
Where it appeared that the mother of the
child whose custody was at issue was regularly
employed and apparently in a position to maintain the child in a suitable environment, while, on
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the other hand, the father appeared to be somewhat irresponsible and either unwilling or unable
to
a suitable environment for the child,
the court m HaymPs v. Haymes (1954 Ky.), 269
SW2d 237, while recognizing that ordinarily in
custody matters the wishes of a child of the. age
of the child here involved ( 13 years) were entitled
to great weight, concluded that under the circumstances of this case, the best interest of the child
would be served by disregarding its expressed
wish to remain with its father, and by granting its
custody to the mother.

It was held in Bmpbacher v. Brupbacher
(1939), 192 La. 219, 187 So. 555, that the mere
fact that a 15-year-old girl desired to live with
her father and her brother, who had been placed
in her father's custody, did not constitute a sufficient reason to establish that this young girl,
who needed her mother's guidance and protection,
should be taken from the custody of her mother,
a person admittedly fit for such charge, and
turned over to her father. It also appeared that
if the girl were to be placed in the custody of her
father, she would be alone much of the time, since
her father was a bus driver and was away from
home a great deal, and her brother was away at
school. Examining all of these factors, the court
apparently concluded that the best interest of the
child would be served by placing her in the custody of her mother.
Where it appeared that the nature of the
father's work was such that he was frequently
required to be absent from home overnight and
on weekends, and that his second wife was a
business-woman, who would be in the home only
after business hours, the court in Lyckburg v.
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Lyckburg (1962 La. App.), 140 So. 2d 487, concluding that if the children were permitted to
remain in the custody of their father they would
•eside in a home that would be to all practical
purposes, run by a house keeper and a maid, held
that notwithstanding the expressed desire of the
children to remain vvith their father, it was settled
jurisprudence that awards of custody were not
dependent upon the wishes or desires ·of the children, and that since the children's best interests
would be served by placing them with their
mother, she was entitled to their custody.
Where the lower court, out of respect for the
desires of a 15-year-old boy, had changed the
custody of the boy from the father to the mother,
the appellate court in Hartma;n v. Hartman (1925
Mo. App.), 277 SW 950, held that while the boy's
wishes were entitled to great weight in deciding
a matter of this kind, the interest of the child was
the paramount consideration, and that if the boy's
condition would be better with his father than
with his mother, his wishes should not govern.
Concluding that the interest of the boy would
best be served by remaining with his father, the
court reversed the decree of the trial court."

In the case of Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2nd P. 36,
386 Pac.2nd 900, this Honorable Court in considering
Section 30-3-5 and Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code
Annotated which have both been rewritten by he 1969
legislature found that the child shall have the privilege
of selecting the divorced parent with whom he wishes
to live unless the parent was immoral or unfit to have
custody. However, Mr. Justice Crockett in a strong dissenting opinion points out the danger of leaving the
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matter of the custody of the minor children to the whim
of the chjldren. (P. 39):
"Further, and more important that the result
in this case, is the fact that the holding with
respect to this statute seems to me to completely
distort its true purpose and reaches a high point
in forbearance of the judicial prerogative, if not
an outright abdication of judicial duty. If the
mere fact that a child has become 10 years old
endows him with power to make a choice of his
parental custodian, which must be honored in any
event, and whether his reasons are good or bad,
or in fact whether he has any reasons at all, so
that his choice is absolute and not subject to control or review by anyone, even by the court, he
could be empowered to make a decision of the
gravest possible consequence to himself, his family, and society, under circumstances where, because of his immaturity, and the usual emotional
stress, there is little assurance that his judgment
would be sound. It would be one of the most
arbitrary and far-reaching prerogatives known to
the law. This is plainly nonsensical and impractical.

... It is submitted that if the whole structure
of the divorce law is looked at in the correct light,
it will be seen that the clear purpose of the. legi slature was to grant to the court discretion to
do what it has always done, i.e., whatever justice
and equity require in regard to the parties, the
children and the property rights, and that there
are a number of reasons why it is unthinkable
that the legislature intended a 10-year-old child
to have any such absolute and incontestable
power.
1
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Under snd1 a rul<>, pan·nts alread.Y too deeply
irnmersed in \Voes because tlw family is breaking
up would haw them added to by having to com1wte with each other for the children's choice.
elaborating thereon it is easy to see the
hazards to them and to the child this would create.
8nch a battle might well go to the more unscrupnlous, who
not be abovP poisoning the child's
mind against the other; or resorting to coPrcion;
or showering him 'vith ill-advised gift:,; or favors.
Even more damaging would be the subjecting of
a child to such pressures and making him a pawn
in the contest of the spouses for his custody. It
is extremely doubtful that under such circumstances a child of that age would have the stability
and judgment to see through the maze and troubles
and make a wise choice. In some instances it
would be crnel to subject him to it and wholly
unrealistic to regard his choice as absoluk
Because of the foregoing, the court should be
reluctant indeed to place this responsibility upon
a small child, forcing him to face and cope with
difficulties which the parents themselves have
found insurmountable. This is especially so when
a further effect is to rob the court itself of the
role the law obviously intends it to play as arbiter
and concilator of troubles which have proved too
much for the family to deal with.

It also must be remembered that any award
of custody made by the court must necessarily be
an integral part of the over-all adjustment of the
family situation. The provision by way of support money or property settlement, and the values
to be found in children being together, are considered by the court in judging what is best for
the welfare of the entire family. This could all
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be lost if the choice were dependent entirely upon
the whim or caprice of a 10-year-old child."
We need not consider these sections of the Statute
however, because they have both been amended to read'
as follows:
Laws of Utah, 1969 - P. 320 and 330, Sec. 30-3-5:
Dispositio·n of property and children - Contimting jurisdiction.
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable. The
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their
support and maintenance, or the distribution of
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary."
30-3-10: Custody of children in case of separation.
"In any case of separation of husband and
wife having minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void o·r dissolved the court shall
make such order for the future care and custody
of the minor children as it may deem just the
proper. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards
of each of the parties and the natural presumption that the mother is best suited to care for
young children. The court may inquire of the
children and take into consideration the children's
desires regarding the future custody; however,
such expressed desires shall not be controlling
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and the court may, nevertheless, determine the
children's custody otherwise."
We respectfully call to the attention of the Court the
language of the above new statute.
In this case the evidence is clear that this mother
has been an honest, devoted parent, during the infancy
of these boys. There is no evidence of any misconduct
on her part. It further appears that the father has an
interest in the boys and a desire to give them all the
necessary things they need during their growing period.
However, there appears on a number of occasions, a
disposition on the part of the Plaintiff to poison the
boys against their mother and to influence them to come
with him rather than to obey the Order of the Court.

When he brought the boys in August to the home
of the Plaintiff and there told her the boys had something to tell her, he knew that he was disobeying the
Order of the Court and so conducted himself for only
one purpose, and that was to discredit her with the
boys and to encourage them to get away from her and
come and live with him. He did not make any attempt
to discourage the boys in their statements that they
would not abide by the ruling of the Court, but by his
conduct he in fact encouraged the boys to disobey the
Order of the Court. It is further evident that the running
away of the boys on September 4 and their having been
received in the apartment of the sister of Rogers' wife,
just had to be planned. The language of the boy, Kim,
that he "needs a father" (Tr. 118) and that "there is
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nothing in common" referring to his rdation with Defendant's new husband, is not the language of a thirteen
year-old boy, but is the transplant of an anxious father
who is helping him to persuade the Court to carry out
his personal whim. It is apparent that these desires of
the boys have been further brought about by the apparent financial position of the Plaintiff's home as against
the Defendant's home. This, of course, should never enter
into a decision of this kind. The fact that the boys have
been raised in a rather modest home, as against the
Plaintiff's more elaborate housing, should not be a factor
in determining who should have the custody. The fact
that the Plaintiff is apparently more able to provide
recreational facilities in the form of motor boats,
campers, and sports cars, also should never be considered
m determining the welfare of these children.
We respectfully submit that the Plaintiff, as father
of these children, has gone out of his way to deliberately
flout the order of the Court. For him to take these little
boys in August to the home of the Defendant and tell her
"The boys have ·some·thing to tell you," and then stand
by while these little boys told their mother that they
were not coming home, could indicate only a cool, calculating, and deliberate plan on the part of the Plaintiff
to violate the Order (Tr. 46). Thereafter, he in August
admittedly registered the children in schools within his
own district which is further proof that at no time did
he intend to carry out the provisions of the Order that
Defendant have custody during the school months. He
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knew what the Order was and he set about to violate
iht· sume by first poisoning the children's minds and
i l!en·after assisting them by registering ti1em in schools
within his district. On September 3rd when Mr. Andrews
drove the boys to get their clothing, they remained in the
lw m;e for 17 minutes. When thev came out to his car
.
'
tht'y had with them their musical instruments and a shirt
apiece (Tr. 101). We submit that this is further proof
of Plaintiff's plan to induce the children to run away
on fat' next morning and thereby violate the Court's
order.

Although Plaintiff testified that he had not run
Defendant down to the children, he told the boys she
was an adulteress, on more than one occasion (Tr. 24-37114). For this contemptuous conduct and his further
participation and assistance in helping the boys run away
and secreting from their mother, the Court awarded him
the permanent cutsody of the children with only overnight visits to the Defendant.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff gloatingly let Defendant
have the children only at his convenience until Defendant
on October 14, 1969, had the Court determine and fix a
definite time when Defendant might visit with the children over night.
Interesting remarks along this line were made by
the Court when counsel told the Court that in fairness
the Defendant would have them overnight only once a
month (Tr. 157) and then at Plaintiff's convenience,
(Tr. 156) as follows:
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''l\1R. HUGGIN8: We have one or two items
hPrP to consider also, yonr Honor.

First of all, thPse youngsters are old enough
that their wishes should be given some weight.
THE COURT: Well, they can't get ont of
their visitation right. That's for sure.
l\1R. HUGGINS: No. Bnt there must be
some reason or some fairness to this thinking
behind the mother and the father and the children
themselves.

Now we can't force those youngsters to like
or dislike someone, by an order of court, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Yon can't force them except
to win them.
MR. HUGGINS: Well, this is possible.
THE COURT: And this fellow wants them
the way he wants them, and they go along. And
then you come here and say it 1s the kids' fault.
Well it isn't. It's this fellow's fault. It's not the
fault of the boys.
MR. HUGGINS: No, I don't think that's
exactly right, your honor.
THE COURT: There isn't any question about
it. He's planned it that way.
It seems apparent that on October 14, 1969, the Court
became aware of the attitude of Plaintiff to deprive De·
f endant, the mother of the children, of having any defin·
ite visitation period and that they wanted her to have
them only at the will and convenience of Plaintiff. The
Court then told counsel Plaintiff had "planned it that
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way." This Plaintiff has been obsessed with the idea
that h1:c would have the custody of these boys by one
or another, regardless of what may be in their
best interest. This in substance is and was Defendant's
entire complaint about the ruling of the Court.
We submit that it was never nor is it now the intention of the legislature to, in amending this statute, leave
the matter of the custody of the children either to the
children themselves nor to permit the parents to compete
for their custody.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that in this case the
Court was willing to follow the expressed wishes of the
children even though there was no evidence of misconduct on the part of defendant. Further, the Court was
willing to yield to the wishes of the boys after their
refusal to obey the order of the Court, and after they
deliberately disobeyed the Order. This Order was also
made after the evidence disclosed that Plaintiff had registered the boys in schools in his own District in August,
knowing full well that the Order of the Court gave the
custody back to Defendant during the school months,
commencing September 1. Plaintiff had deliberately
planned and connived to get the custody from Defendant
and to aid the boys in avoiding the order of the Court.
The Court has erroneously permitted Plaintiff to
force the custody change upon the Court when there
was nothing to justify such change, except the whim of

the .rnung boys and the dPsigning tactics of tlw Plaintiff
who deliberately planned the events as herein described
that led to the Court's Order awarding permanent
tody to Plaintiff.
vVe submit such conduct should n<>ver be condoned,
especially where it does not appear that the best interests of tlw children are served by such a ruling.
Th Court had carefully considered the desires of the
boys and what was for their best interests at the June
hearing. This gave them summer custody to the father
with overnight week-end visits to the mother during the
summer months and the reverse during the school term
This is a fair and reasonable order and takes into consideration the desires of the boys plus the natural presumption that the mother is best suited to care for young
children. This Order should have continued and should
now stand as in the best interests of the children.
RPspectfnlly submitted,

LA MAR DUNCAN
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant

